Her approach to comedy is simple, yet genius: Vergara is also widely admired for her business savvy.
So it may be worth sketching in brief outline the two basic philosophical approaches to counterinsurgency that developed over the 20th century a period which I have written about elsewhere as "Classical Counterinsurgency".
These two contrasting schools of thought about counterinsurgency might be labeled Classic and contemporary theories of latino "enemy-centric" and "population-centric". The enemy-centric approach basically understands counter-insurgency as a variant of conventional warfare.
It sees counterinsurgency as a contest with an organized enemy, and believes that we must defeat that enemy as our primary task. There are many variants within this approach, including "soft line" and "hard line" approaches, kinetic and non-kinetic methods of defeating the enemy, decapitation versus marginalization strategies, and so on.
Many of these strategic concepts are shared with the population-centric school of counterinsurgency, but the philosophy differs. In a nut-shell, it could be summarized as "first defeat the enemy, and all else will follow".
The population-centric approach understands counter-insurgency as fundamentally a control problem, or even an armed variant of government administration.
It believes that establishing control over the population, and the environment physical, human and informational in which that population lives, is the essential task.
Again, there are many variants within this approach, including some very hard-line methods and some softer approaches, but the underlying philosophy is "first control the population, and all else will follow". The key to "good counterinsurgency practice" is the agile integration of civil and military measures across security, economic, political and information tracks -- and this is something that has to be done regardless of which approach you adopt, and is just as necessary in both.
Now, some people are quite committed to one or the other school of thought Galula, for example, flatly states that the population-centric approach is always correct, and the new FM takes a similar but less absolute stance.
But my experience has been that both are applicable in varying degrees in most insurgencies, and at different times in the life of any one insurgency - since, over time, the nature of insurgencies shifts. The real art is to "read the battle" and understand how it is developing, fast enough to adapt.
Neither the enemy-centric nor the population-centric approaches are always or universally appropriate -- there is no cookie-cutter, and no substitute for situation-specific analysis informed by extremely deep local area and cultural knowledge.
As an example of the need to read the battle and adapt, I hope you will forgive a brief personal anecdote. In Timor in I worked closely with village elders in the border districts. In actual fact, we were out in large numbers, securing the border against infiltration, patrolling by night, conducting 14 to day patrols in the jungle to deny the militias a chance to build sanctuaries, and working in close in the villages to maintain popular support.
There had not been a single successful attack by the insurgents on the population for more than two months. So, "objectively", they were secure. This was exacerbated by the fact that they had just experienced a major psychological trauma occupation, insurgency, mass destruction and international intervention and as a society they needed time and support for a degree of "mental reconstruction".
Based on their feedback and that of lots of other meetings and observations we changed our operational approach, became a bit more visible to the population and focused on giving them the feeling, as well as the reality, of safety. Once we did that, it was fine.
In other words, we had to shift from a more enemy-centric approach to a more population-centric approach to adjust to the developing situation.
My personal lesson from this experience was that the correct approach is situation-dependent, and the situation changes over time. Therefore the key is to develop mechanisms that allow you to read the environment, to be agile and to adapt, as John Nagl showed so brilliantly in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife.
Both have merit, but the key is to first diagnose the environment, then design a tailor-made approach to counter the insurgency, and - most critically - have a system for generating continuous, real-time feedback from the environment that allows you to know what effect you are having, and adapt as needed."Classical liberalism" is the term used to designate the ideology advocating private property, an unhampered market economy, the rule of law, constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion and of the press, and international peace based on free trade.
Up until around , this ideology was. Classical Liberalism vs. Modern Liberalism and Modern Conservatism. For example, speech that is permissible if the speaker is black might be actionable if the speaker were white, Asian or Hispanic, depending on how the speech affects the sensibilities of other blacks.
what is needed is a neoclassical synthesis — a political theory.
General Overviews. Studies about sovereignty can be distinguished into classic works that shaped modern politics and contemporary scholarship that discusses sovereignty within the academic discipline of international relations.
As part of Hispanic Heritage Month, Variety spotlights 20 of the most successful Latino actors and actresses today. Hence this review of Classical Management Theories was done. This article will provide the basic knowledge of Classical Management Theories as The term management drives from Latin word “Manu agere” which means to lead by hand.
Lead by hand means, giving directions. Situational Management theories and Modern Management Theories . We ask new questions about aspects of American life long taken for granted; we also take American culture as a site for testing classic and contemporary theories about how cultures work.
NEASA Spring Colloquium.